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Abstract. Dialogical argumentation allows agents to interact by con-
structing and evaluating arguments through a dialogue. Numerous pro-
posals have been made for protocols for dialogical argumentation, and
recently there is interest in developing better strategies for agents to
improve their own outcomes from the interaction by using an opponent
model to guide their strategic choices. However, there is a lack of clear
formal reasons for why or how such a model might be useful, or how it
can be maintained. In this paper, we consider a simple type of persuasion
dialogue, investigate options for using and updating an opponent model,
and identify conditions under which such use of a model is beneficial.
1 Introduction
Argument dialogues are an established agreement technology; they provide a
principled way of structuring rational interactions between participants (machine
or human) who argue about the validity of certain claims in order to resolve their
conflicting information, competing goals, incompatible intentions or opposing
views of the world [1]. Such dialogues are typically defined by the moves that
can be made and rules to determine which moves are permissible at any point
in the dialogue. Much existing work in the field focusses on defining argument
dialogues that allow achievement of a particular goal; for example, to persuade
the other participant to accept some belief [2] or to agree on some action to
achieve a shared goal [3]. However, successful achievement of a participant’s
dialogue goal normally depends on the strategy it employs to determine which of
the permissible moves to make during the dialogue; the development of effective
argument dialogue strategies is thus an important area of active research [4].
Recent work on argument dialogue strategy assumes the strategiser has some
uncertain model of what its interlocutor knows, derived somehow from the strate-
giser’s past interactions, which it uses to guide its choice of moves [5, 6]. However,
there is a lack of formal investigation into how such a model can be maintained
and under what circumstances it can be useful. Rienstra et al. propose a mecha-
nism for updating an opponent model with the addition of arguments proposed
or received by the opponent [6], Black et al.’s approach involves also removing
from the opponent model anything that is inconsistent with the observed oppo-
nent behaviour [5], while Hadjinikolis et al. consider how an agent can develop
a model of the likelihood that an opponent will know a particular argument
if it asserts some other argument [7, 8]; however, none of these works formally
investigate the impact of the model update mechanism on the dialogue outcome.
We are interested in understanding the different options for updating an op-
ponent model and investigating the circumstances under which such a model
can be useful. We consider a simple type of persuasion dialogue with two partic-
ipants, the persuader and the responder. The persuader (who has an uncertain
model of the responder) aims to convince the responder to accept the topic of
the dialogue by asserting beliefs, while the responder replies honestly to indicate
whether it is currently convinced of the acceptability of the topic.
We investigate the performance of two model update mechanisms, based on
those used by Rienstra et al. [6] and Black et al. [5]. In the first (which we refer
to as basic), beliefs asserted by the persuader are added to its model of the re-
sponder, while the second mechanism (which we refer to as smart) also removes
from the persuader’s model of the responder anything that is inconsistent with
the moves the responder makes (under the assumption that the responder is
honest). We do not focus here on how the persuader determines which beliefs
to assert and which order to assert them in; we assume the persuader has a
mechanism for determining some total ordering over its beliefs (which we refer
to as its strategy and corresponds to the order in which it will assert its beliefs)
and instead focus on whether it uses its model of the responder to decide when
to give up trying to persuade the responder. We consider the case where the per-
suader will not give up until it has exhausted all its beliefs (called an exhaustive
persuader) and the case where the persuader will give up as soon as, given its
model of the responder, it believes it is not possible to successfully persuade the
responder no matter which beliefs it asserts (called an economical persuader).
We formally investigate the performance of our model update mechanisms
by identifying the situations in which it is possible that, when following the same
strategy, a persuader of one type will successfully persuade the responder, while
a persuader of another type will unsuccessfully terminate the dialogue before it
has achieved its goal. This paper thus contributes to our understanding of when
it can be advantageous to use a particular model update mechanism.
2 Simple persuasion dialogues
In our simple persuasion dialogues (adapted from the simple persuasion dialogues
of Black et al. [5]) the persuader aims to convince the responder to accept the
topic of the dialogue by asserting beliefs. We make no prescription as to which
semantics the participants use to reason about the acceptability of beliefs. We
assume only a finite logical language L and some function for determining the
set of acceptable claims given some knowledge base of L.
Definition 1. For a knowledge base Φ ⊆ L, the function Acceptable : ℘(L) →
℘(L) returns the set of acceptable claims of Φ such that: Acceptable(Φ) =
{α ∈ L | α is acceptable given Φ under the chosen acceptability semantics}.
There are many formalisms and associated acceptability semantics that may
be used to instantiate Definition 1. For example: we could consider a standard
propositional language L and specify that a claim α is acceptable given Φ ⊆ L
if and only if α can be classically entailed from Φ; it could be that L consists
of atoms that represent abstract arguments and a claim α is acceptable given
Φ ⊆ L if and only if α is in the grounded extension of the argument framework
constructed from Φ according to a particular defeat relation defined over L [9];
or Φ ⊆ L may represent an ASPIC+ knowledge base and we may specify that α
is acceptable given Φ ⊆ L if and only if α is the claim of an admissible argument
from the Dung-style argument framework constructed from Φ and a particular
ASPIC+ argumentation system [10].
A simple persuasion dialogue has a topic (a wff of L) and involves two par-
ticipants, the persuader and the responder. Each participant has a position (a
subset of L) and the persuader has an uncertain model of the responder, which
is a set consisting of those subsets of L that the persuader believes may be the
responder’s position. (Note that, unlike in [5], here we do not consider probabili-
ties associated with the persuader’s model.) We define a dialogue scenario by the
participants, the participants’ positions, the persuader’s model of the responder
and the topic. A dialogue scenario is accurate if the responder’s position is a
member of the persuader’s model of the responder.
Definition 2. A dialogue scenario is a tuple (Ag,P0, Υ0, τ) where:
– Ag = {agP , agR} is the set of participants, agP is the persuader and agR
is the responder;
– P0 : Ag → ℘(L) is a function that returns each participant’s position;
– Υ0 ⊆ ℘(L) is the persuader’s model of the responder;
– τ ∈ L is the topic of the dialogue.
(Ag,P0, Υ0, τ) is accurate iff P0(agR) ∈ Υ0. The set of all dialogue scenarios is
denoted S. The set of all accurate dialogue scenarios is denoted Sacc.
Example 1. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, f) be a dialogue scenario. If P0(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
P0(agR) = {b} and Υ0 = {{a, b}, {a, c}}, then ds is not accurate. If P0(agP ) =
{a, b, c, d, e}, P0(agR) = {b} and Υ0 = {{a, b}, {a, c}, {b}}, then ds is accurate.
The set of moves used in simple persuasion dialogues is M = {(open, τ),
(assert, φ), (pass), (close)} where τ ∈ L is the topic of the dialogue, φ ∈ L,
and the function Sender : M → Ag returns the sender of a move. A simple
persuasion dialogue is a sequence of dialogue states, where each state consists
of a move being made, a function that returns each participant’s position after
that move has been made, and a set that represents the persuader’s model of
the responder after that move has been made. The participants take it in turn
to make moves. The persuader always starts by opening with the dialogue topic,
following which it can assert a wff of L or make a close move. The responder
can make a close or a pass move. The persuader cannot repeat assertions. The
last move of the dialogue, and only the last move, is always a close move (and so
either participant can chose to terminate the dialogue by making a close move);
if this move is made by the responder, the dialogue is successful, otherwise it is
unsuccessful. The length of a dialogue is equal to the number of dialogue states.
Definition 3. A simple persuasion dialogue of dialogue scenario (Ag,P0, Υ0, τ)
is a sequence of dialogue states [(m1,P1, Υ1), . . . , (mt,Pt, Υt)] where ∀ s such
that 1 ≤ s ≤ t:
1. Ps : Ag → ℘(L);
2. Υs ⊆ ℘(L);
3. ms ∈ {(open, τ), (assert, φ), (pass), (close)} where φ ∈ L;
4. ms = (open, τ) iff s = 1;
5. if s is odd, then Sender(ms) = agP and ms ∈ {(open, τ), (assert, φ), (close)};
6. if s is even, then Sender(ms) = agR and ms ∈ {(pass), (close)};
7. ms = (close) iff s = t;
8. if ms = (assert, φ), then ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i < s, mi 6= (assert, φ).
Let d = [(m1,P1, Υ1), . . . , (mt,Pt, Υt)] be a simple persuasion dialogue: the length
of d, denoted Length(d), is t; d is successful iff Sender(mt) = agR.
The previous definition defines the protocol that participants of a simple
persuasion dialogue must abide by. We also make some assumptions about the
behaviour of the dialogue participants, namely: the persuader’s position does
not change during the dialogue (so it is not engaged with any processes external
to the dialogue); the persuader only asserts things that are part of its own
position (so it is honest); the responder’s position is updated only to include
things asserted by the persuader (so the responder trusts the persuader and is
not engaged with any processes external to the dialogue); and the responder’s
moves accurately reflect whether it has been successfully convinced of the topic
(so it is honest). If these assumptions hold we say the dialogue is regular.
Definition 4. A simple persuasion dialogue [(m1,P1, Υ1), . . . , (mt,Pt, Υt)] of di-
alogue scenario (Ag,P0, Υ0, τ) is a regular simple persuasion dialogue iff
∀ s such that 1 ≤ s ≤ t:
1. Ps(agP ) = P0(agP );
2. if ms = (assert, φ), then φ ∈ P0(agP ), and Ps(agR) = Ps−1(agR) ∪ {φ};
3. τ ∈ Acceptable(Ps−1(agR)) iff s = t and Sender(ms) = agR.
The set of all regular simple persuasion dialogues of a dialogue scenario ds is
denoted Dialoguesreg(ds).
The responder of a regular simple persuasion dialogue has no choice over the
moves it can make; since we assume it to be honest, it terminates the dialogue
with a close move if and only if it finds the topic to be acceptable, otherwise it
makes a pass move. The persuader, however, can chose which beliefs to assert
and whether to (unsuccessfully) terminate the dialogue; we consider conditions
under which different types of persuader will terminate the dialogue in Section 3.
Example 2. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, f) be a dialogue scenario with topic f such
that P0(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e}, P0(agR) = {b}, Υ0 = {{a, b}, {a, c}}. The only sets
of beliefs that determine the topic f to be acceptable (i.e., the only sets Φ such
that f ∈ Acceptable(Φ)) are {b, c, d} and {a, b, c}.
The following are each simple persuasion dialogues of ds. (In dialogues d1 and
d3 the persuader’s model of the responder is not updated, while in dialogues
d2 and d4 the persuader’s model is updated to include beliefs asserted by the
persuader. We formally define model update methods in Section 3.)
d1 = [((open, f),P1, Υ1), ((pass),P2, Υ2), ((close),P3, Υ3)] where
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, Pi(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, Pi(agR) = {b},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, Υi = {{a, b}, {a, c}}.
d1 is a regular unsuccessful dialogue.
d2 = [((open, f),P1, Υ1), ((pass),P2, Υ2), ((assert, b),P3, Υ3), ((pass),P4, Υ4),
((assert, c),P5, Υ5), ((pass),P6, Υ6), ((close),P7, Υ7)] where
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, Pi(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, Pi(agR) = {b},
– ∀ i such that 5 ≤ i ≤ 7, Pi(agR) = {b, c},
– Υ1 = Υ2 = {{a, b}, {a, c}},
– Υ3 = Υ4 = {{a, b}, {a, b, c}},
– ∀ i such that 5 ≤ i ≤ 7, Υi = {{a, b, c}}.
d2 is a regular unsuccessful dialogue.
d3 = [((open, f),P1, Υ1), ((pass),P2, Υ2), ((assert, b),P3, Υ3), ((pass),P4, Υ4),
((assert, c),P5, Υ5), ((pass),P6, Υ6), ((assert, a),P7, Υ7), ((close),P8, Υ8)] where
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, Pi(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, Pi(agR) = {b},
– P5(agR) = P6(agR) = {b, c},
– P7(agR) = P8(agR) = {a, b, c},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 8, Υi = Υi−1.
d3 is a regular successful dialogue.
d4 = [((open, f),P1, Υ1), ((pass),P2, Υ2), ((assert, b),P3, Υ3), ((close),P4, Υ4)]
where
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, Pi(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, Pi(agR) = {b},
– Υ1 = Υ2 = {{a, b}, {a, c}},
– Υ3 = Υ4 = {{a, b}, {a, b, c}}.
d4 is not a regular dialogue, since at the point the responder successfully termi-
nates the dialogue it does not find the topic to be acceptable.
We have now defined some assumptions about the behaviour of participants
in a regular simple persuasion dialogue, however, we are yet to consider how the
persuader updates or uses its model of the responder. In the following section
we define different types of persuader according to the mechanism it uses to
update its model of the responder and according to whether it will choose to
unsuccessfully terminate the dialogue once, according to its (possibly incorrect)
model, it believes it is impossible to convince the responder.
3 Updating and using an opponent model
We first consider how a persuader may use its model of the responder to deter-
mine when to give up trying to persuade the responder. An economical persuader
only makes a close move (and will always make a close move) when, according
to its model of the responder, it believes there is no sequence of assertions it
can make that will lead to a successful dialogue; that is, for every set Ψ that it
believes could possibly be the responder’s position, there is no subset of its own
position that it can assert (i.e., contains no beliefs already asserted) and that,
when combined with Ψ , would determine the topic to be acceptable.
Definition 5. Let d = [(m1,P1, Υ1), . . . , (mt,Pt, Υt)] ∈ Dialoguesreg((Ag,P0, Υ0, τ)).
We say d has an economical persuader iff:
1. if Sender(mt) = agP , then ∀Ψ ∈ Υt−1, @Φ ⊆ Pt−1(agP ) such that:
(a) Φ 6= ∅,
(b) Φ ∩ {φ | ∃ s such that 1 ≤ s < t and ms = (assert, φ)} = ∅,
(c) τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪ Φ);
2. ∀s such that 1 ≤ s < t and s is odd, ∃Ψ ∈ Υs−1 such that ∃Φ ⊆ Ps−1(agP )
such that:
(a) Φ 6= ∅,
(b) Φ ∩ {φ | ∃ i such that 1 ≤ i < s and mi = (assert, φ)} = ∅,
(c) τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪ Φ);
Example 3. Of the three regular dialogues given in Example 2 (d1, d2 and d3)
only d2 and d3 have an economical persuader.
We now define three types of persuader whose performance we will later
explore. An exhaustive persuader does not maintain its model of the responder
and will only terminate the dialogue once it has exhausted all beliefs it can
assert (i.e., does not consider its model when deciding whether to terminate the
dialogue). A basic persuader is an economical persuader that only updates its
opponent model to reflect that the responder is aware of things the persuader
has asserted. A persuader is smart if it is an economical persuader that updates
its opponent model to reflect that the responder is aware of things the persuader
has asserted and also removes from its model sets that are inconsistent with
the responder’s behaviour (assuming a regular dialogue). Thus, if the responder
makes a pass move, a smart persuader removes from its model any sets that
determine the topic to be acceptable (since it assumes the responder is honest).
Definition 6. Let d = [(m1,P1, Υ1), . . . , (mt,Pt, Υt)] ∈ Dialoguesreg((Ag,P0, Υ0, τ)).
d has an exhaustive persuader iff: if Sender(mt) = agP , then ∀φ ∈ Pt−1(agP ),
∃ s such that 1 ≤ s < t and ms = (assert, φ) and ∀ s such that 1 ≤ s ≤ t:
Υs = Υs−1.
d has a basic persuader iff d has an economical persuader and ∀ s such that
1 ≤ s ≤ t: if ms = (assert, φ), then Υs = {Ψ ∪ {φ} | Ψ ∈ Υs−1}; otherwise
Υs = Υs−1.
d has a smart persuader iff d has an economical persuader and ∀ s such that
1 ≤ s ≤ t: if ms = (assert, φ), then Υs = {Ψ ∪{φ} | Ψ ∈ Υs−1}; if ms = (pass),
then Υs = {Ψ ∈ Υs−1 | τ 6∈ Acceptable(Ψ)}; otherwise Υs = Υs−1.
Example 4. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, f) be the dialogue scenario given in Example 2
where P0(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e}, P0(agR) = {b}, Υ0 = {{a, b}, {a, c}} and the only
sets of beliefs that determine the topic of the dialogue to be acceptable (i.e., the
only sets Φ such that f ∈ Acceptable(Φ)) are {b, c, d} and {a, b, c}.
The persuader of the dialogue d1 given in Example 2 is neither exhaustive, basic
nor smart. The persuader of the dialogue d2 given in Example 2 is basic. The
persuader of the dialogue d3 given in Example 2 is exhaustive.
d5 = [((open, f),P1, Υ1), ((pass),P2, Υ2), ((assert, b),P3, Υ3), ((pass),P4, Υ4),
((assert, c),P5, Υ5), ((pass),P6, Υ6), ((close),P7, Υ7)] where
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, Pi(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, Pi(agR) = {b},
– ∀ i such that 5 ≤ i ≤ 7, Pi(agR) = {b, c},
– Υ1 = Υ2 = {{a, b}, {a, c}},
– Υ3 = {{a, b}, {a, b, c}},
– Υ4 = {{a, b}},
– Υ5 = {{a, b, c}},
– Υ6 = Υ7 = ∅.
d5 is a regular unsuccessful dialogue with a smart persuader.
d6 = [((open, f),P1, Υ1), ((pass),P2, Υ2), ((assert, a),P3, Υ3), ((pass),P4, Υ4),
((assert, d),P5, Υ5), ((pass),P6, Υ6), ((assert, c),P7, Υ7), ((pass),P8, Υ8),
((assert, e),P9, Υ9), ((pass),P10, Υ10), ((assert, b),P11, Υ11), ((pass),P12, Υ12),
((close),P13, Υ13)] where
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, Pi(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– P1(agR) = P2(agR) = {b},
– P3(agR) = P4(agR) = {a, b},
– P5(agR) = P6(agR) = {a, b, d},
– P7(agR) = P8(agR) = {a, b, c, d},
– ∀ i such that 9 ≤ i ≤ 13, Pi(agR) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 13, Υi = Υi− 1.
d6 is a regular unsuccessful dialogue with an exhaustive persuader.
It follows from our definitions that if a regular dialogue of an accurate scenario
has a basic or smart persuader, the persuader’s model will remain accurate
throughout the dialogue (i.e., the responder’s actual beliefs will always be a
member of the persuader’s model).
Lemma 1. If ds ∈ Sacc and [(m1,P1, Υ1), . . . , (mt,Pt, Υt)] ∈ Dialoguesreg(ds)
has a basic or smart persuader, then for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ t, Pi(agR) ∈ Υi.
In the following section, we define how a dialogue is generated from a partic-
ular dialogue scenario by a particular type of persuader.
4 Generating dialogues
We are interested in exploring the usefulness of our model update mechanisms
when the persuader uses its model of the responder to decide when to unsuc-
cessfully terminate the dialogue. We are not concerned here with the strategical
choices the persuader makes to determine which beliefs to assert and which order
to assert them in, but rather assume that the persuader has some mechanism
for determining this. We define a strategy for a dialogue scenario as a sequence
of beliefs that is some permutation of the persuader’s position, corresponding
to the order in which it will assert beliefs. Different dialogues may be generated
from the same dialogue scenario by persuaders of different types following the
same strategy, since an economical persuader will choose to terminate the di-
alogue once it thinks it is in a hopeless position according to its model of the
responder, and a basic and a smart persuader’s models may diverge.
Definition 7. A strategy of a dialogue scenario (Ag,P0, Υ0, τ) ∈ S is a se-
quence [α1, . . . , αn] such that {α1, . . . , αn} = P0(agP ) and ∀ i, i′ such that 1 ≤
i, i′ ≤ n, αi = αi′ iff i = i′.
Example 5. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, f) be the dialogue scenario given in Example 2
where P0(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e}, P0(agR) = {b} and Υ0 = {{a, b}, {a, c}}.
Examples of strategies of ds are [b, c, a, d, e] and [b, c, a, e, d]. However, [b, c, e] is
not a strategy of ds and [b, c, a, c, d, e] is not a strategy of ds.
Whether the persuader makes a close move is determined by its initial po-
sition, the assertions it has already made and (in the case of an economical
persuader) its model of the responder; whether the responder makes a close
move is determined by its initial position and the assertions made by the per-
suader. Thus each possible strategy maps to exactly one dialogue for each type
of persuader and a given dialogue scenario, where the assertions made during
the dialogue correspond to a prefix of the strategy; we say this is the dialogue of
the persuader type generated by the strategy from the dialogue scenario.
Definition 8. Let ds ∈ S, T ∈ {exh, bas, sm} and st = [α1, . . . , αn] be a strat-
egy of ds. The dialogue of type T generated by st from ds, denoted
Dialogue(ds, T, st), is d = [(m1,P1, Υ1), . . . , (mt,Pt, Υt)] (t ≤ 2n+ 2) such that
1. d ∈ Dialoguesreg(ds),
2. ∀ i such that 1 < i < t and i is odd, mi = (assert, αx) where x = i−12 ,
3. if T = exh, then d has an exhaustive persuader,
4. if T = bas, then d has a basic persuader,
5. if T = sm, then d has a smart persuader.
Example 6. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, f) be the dialogue scenario given in Example 2
where P0(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e}, P0(agR) = {b}, Υ0 = {{a, b}, {a, c}} and the only
sets of beliefs that determine the topic f to be acceptable (i.e., the only sets Φ
such that f ∈ Acceptable(Φ)) are {b, c, d} and {a, b, c}.
Let st1 = [b, c, a, d, e], st2 = [b, c, a, e, d], st3 = [a, d, c, e, b] be strategies of ds.
Dialogue(ds, bas, st1) = Dialogue(ds, bas, st2) = d2 (as given in Example 2).
Dialogue(ds, sm, st1) = Dialogue(ds, sm, st2) = d5 (as given in Example 4).
Dialogue(ds, exh, st3) = d6 (as given in Example 4).
It follows from Definition 6 that if a basic and a smart persuader each follow
the same strategy, the smart persuader’s model will be a subset of the basic
persuader’s model at corresponding points in the two dialogues produced.
Lemma 2. If ds ∈ S and st is a strategy of ds such that Dialogue(ds, bas, st) =
[(mb1 ,Pb1 , Υb1), . . . , (mbn ,Pbn , Υbn)] and Dialogue(ds, sm, st) = [(ms1 ,Ps1 , Υs1), . . . ,
(msm ,Psm , Υsm)], then ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ m, if i ≤ n, then Υsi ⊆ Υbi .
It follows from our definitions and the previous lemma, that the smart dia-
logue generated by a particular strategy from a dialogue scenario is never longer
than the basic dialogue generated with the same strategy, which is never longer
than the exhaustive dialogue generated.
Proposition 1. If ds ∈ S and st is a strategy of ds, then
Length(Dialogue(ds, exh, st)) ≥ Length(Dialogue(ds, bas, st)) ≥
Length(Dialogue(ds, sm, st)).
In the following section, we compare the performance of the different types
of persuader we have defined (exhaustive, basic, smart). In particular, we iden-
tify the situations in which a persuader of one type can be successful while a
persuader of another type may be unsuccessful.
5 Performance of model update mechanisms
We are interested in identifying the situations when a persuader of one type can
have an advantage over a persuader of another type; i.e., when, following a par-
ticular strategy, a persuader of one type will successfully convince the responder,
while a persuader of another type will not. We show that, for accurate scenarios,
there is no difference in success of the different persuader types (Table 1). For
accurate scenarios, the only difference in the dialogues produced by the different
types of persuader with a particular strategy is that, if the dialogues produced
are unsuccessful, a smart persuader may terminate the dialogue before a basic
persuader, who may terminate before an exhaustive persuader.
We show that, for scenarios that are not accurate, it is possible for an ex-
haustive persuader to generate a successful dialogue, while a basic and a smart
persuader each generate an unsuccessful dialogue with the same strategy. We
also show that it is possible for an exhaustive and a basic persuader to each gen-
erate a successful dialogue, while a smart persuader generates an unsuccessful
dialogue with the same strategy. (These results are summarised in Table 2.)
5.1 Performance of mechanisms for accurate scenarios
If we consider only accurate scenarios, if a persuader of a particular type gen-
erates a successful dialogue with a given strategy, then a persuader of either of
the other types will generate the same dialogue with the same strategy. This
follows from Lemma 1, the definitions of basic, smart and exhaustive persuaders
(Def. 6) and the assumptions we have made about regular dialogues (Def. 4).
Lemma 3. If ds ∈ Sacc and st is a strategy of ds such that Dialogue(ds, T, st) is
successful (where T ∈ {exh, bas, sm}) then ∀ T′ ∈ {exh, bas, sm}, Dialogue(ds, T, st) =
Dialogue(ds, T′, st).
If we again consider only accurate scenarios, but with a strategy that gener-
ates an unsuccessful dialogue for one persuader type, then the same strategy will
also generate an unsuccessful dialogue for each of the other persuader types (in
this case the dialogue generated by a smart persuader may be shorter than the
dialogue generated by a basic persuader, which may be shorter than the dialogue
generated by an exhaustive persuader, which must be of length 2n+3 where n is
the size of the persuader’s position). Again, this follows from Lemma 1, the def-
initions of basic, smart and exhaustive persuaders (Def. 6) and the assumptions
we have made about regular dialogues (Def. 4).
Lemma 4. If ds ∈ Sacc and st is a strategy of ds such that Dialogue(ds, T, st) is
unsuccessful (where T ∈ {exh, bas, sm}) then ∀ T′ ∈ {exh, bas, sm}, Dialogue(ds, T′, st)
is also unsuccessful.
It is clear from the above results that there are no accurate dialogue scenarios
for which there is any difference in success of the different agent types.
Proposition 2. @ ds ∈ Sacc such that st is a strategy of ds, Dialogue(ds, T, st) is
successful, Dialogue(ds, T′, st) is unsuccessful, T, T′ ∈ {exh, bas, sm} and T′ 6= T.
It is straightforward to construct examples to show that there are accurate
dialogue scenarios in which, when following the same strategy, all agent types will
be successful (similarly unsuccessful). This gives us the following propositions.
Proposition 3. ∃ ds ∈ Sacc such that st is a strategy of ds and ∀ T ∈ {exh, bas, sm},
Dialogue(ds, T, st) is successful.
Proposition 4. ∃ ds ∈ Sacc such that st is a strategy of ds and ∀ T ∈ {exh, bas, sm},
Dialogue(ds, T, st) is unsuccessful.
These results are summarised in Table 1.
5.2 Performance of mechanisms for scenarios that are not accurate
For any dialogue scenario (accurate or not), if the dialogue generated by an
exhaustive persuader with a particular strategy is unsuccessful, then the dia-
logue generated by a basic persuader with the same strategy is unsuccessful;
Outcome by persuader type Outcome combination possible
for accurate dialogue scenarios?
Exhaustive Basic Smart
Successful Successful Successful Yes (Proposition 3)
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Yes (Proposition 4)
Successful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful No (Proposition 2)
Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful No (Proposition 2)
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Successful No (Proposition 2)
Unsuccessful Successful Successful No (Proposition 2)
Successful Unsuccessful Successful No (Proposition 2)
Successful Successful Unsuccessful No (Proposition 2)
Table 1. For an accurate dialogue scenario and a particular strategy, identifies possible
combinations of outcomes by persuader type.
similarly, if the dialogue generated by a basic persuader with a particular strat-
egy is unsuccessful, then the dialogue generated by a smart persuader with the
same strategy is unsuccessful. This follows from Lemma 2, the definition of an
exhaustive persuader (Def. 6) and the assumptions we have made about regular
dialogues (Def. 4).
Lemma 5. Let ds ∈ S and st be a strategy of ds.
If Dialogue(ds, exh, st) is unsuccessful, then Dialogue(ds, bas, st) is unsuccessful.
If Dialogue(ds, bas, st) is unsuccessful, then Dialogue(ds, sm, st) is unsuccessful.
It follows straightforwardly from the above lemma that there are no dialogue
scenarios for which (when following the same strategy) a smart persuader will be
successful while either an exhaustive or a basic persuader will be unsuccessful,
nor are there any dialogue scenario for which a basic persuader will be successful
but an exhaustive persuader (with the same strategy) will be unsuccessful.
Proposition 5. @ ds ∈ S\Sacc such that st is a strategy of ds, Dialogue(ds, sm, st)
is successful, Dialogue(ds, T, st) is unsuccessful, and T ∈ {exh, bas}.
Proposition 6. @ ds ∈ S\Sacc such that st is a strategy of ds, Dialogue(ds, bas, st)
is successful and Dialogue(ds, exh, st) is unsuccessful.
We now show by example that all other combinations of difference in outcome
from the different persuader types are possible. First, we show that there exists a
dialogue scenario that is not accurate in which all persuader types are successful.
Proposition 7. ∃ ds ∈ S \ Sacc such that st is a strategy of ds, and ∀ T ∈
{exh, bas, sm}, Dialogue(ds, T, st) is successful.
Proof. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, f) be a dialogue scenario with topic f such that
P0(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e}, P0(agR) = {b}, Υ0 = {{d}}. The only sets of be-
liefs that determine the topic f to be acceptable (i.e., the only sets Φ such that
f ∈ Acceptable(Φ)) are {a, b, c} and {a, c, d, e}.
Following the strategy [a, c, e, d, b], each of the persuader types produces a suc-
cessful dialogue where after it has asserted a and then c the responder will close
the dialogue, indicating it has been persuaded.
We now show that there exists a dialogue scenario that is not accurate in
which all persuader types are unsuccessful.
Proposition 8. ∃ ds ∈ S \ Sacc such that st is a strategy of ds, and ∀ T ∈
{exh, bas, sm}, Dialogue(ds, T, st) is unsuccessful.
Proof. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, f) be a dialogue scenario with topic f such that
P0(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e}, P0(agR) = {b, d}, Υ0 = {{a}, {d, e}}. The only sets of
beliefs that determine the topic f to be acceptable (i.e., the only sets Φ such that
f ∈ Acceptable(Φ)) are {a, b, c} and {a, c, d, e}.
For all possible strategies of this dialogue scenario, each of the different persuader
types will produce an unsuccessful dialogue (since there is no superset of the
responder’s initial position that determines the topic to be acceptable).
We now show the existence of a dialogue scenario that is not accurate in
which, when following a particular strategy, an exhaustive persuader will be
successful but both a basic and a smart persuader will be unsuccessful.
Proposition 9. ∃ ds ∈ S\Sacc such that st is a strategy of ds, Dialogue(ds, exh, st)
is successful, and ∀ T ∈ {bas, sm}, Dialogue(ds, T, st) is unsuccessful.
Proof. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, f) be a dialogue scenario with topic f such that
P0(agP ) = {a, b, c, d}, P0(agR) = {b, e}, Υ0 = {{a, b}, {b, c}}. The only sets of
beliefs that determine the topic f to be acceptable (i.e., the only sets Φ such that
f ∈ Acceptable(Φ)) are {a, c, d} and {b, d, e}.
No matter what strategy they are following, both a smart and a basic persuader
will choose to terminate the dialogue unsuccessfully without asserting any beliefs,
since according to their model of the responder they believe there is no way the
responder can successfully be persuaded (as there is no superset of any element
of its model that determines the topic to be acceptable). However, an exhaustive
persuader with a strategy that chooses to assert d first will be successful.
Finally, we show the existence of a dialogue scenario that is not accurate
in which, when following a particular strategy, both an exhaustive and a basic
persuader will be successful but a smart persuader will be unsuccessful.
Proposition 10. ∃ ds ∈ S\Sacc such that st is a strategy of ds, ∀ T ∈ {exh, bas}
Dialogue(ds, T, st) is successful, and Dialogue(ds, sm, st) is unsuccessful.
Proof. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, f) be a dialogue scenario with topic f such that
P0(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e}, P0(agR) = {a, b}, Υ0 = {{b, e}, {b, d}, {c}}. The only
sets of beliefs that determine the topic f to be acceptable (i.e., the only sets Φ
such that f ∈ Acceptable(Φ)) are {a, b, d}, {a, b, e}, {b, c} and {a, b, d, e}.
Consider the strategy st = [a, e, b, d, c].
Dialogue(ds, exh, st) = [((open, f),P1, Υ0), ((pass),P2, Υ0), ((assert, a),P3, Υ0),
((pass),P4, Υ0), ((assert, e),P5, Υ0), ((close),P6, Υ0)] where
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, Pi(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, Pi(agR) = {a, b},
– P5(agR) = P6(agR) = {a, b, e}.
Dialogue(ds, bas, st) = [((open, f),P1, Υ1), ((pass),P2, Υ2), ((assert, a),P3, Υ3),
((pass),P4, Υ4), ((assert, e),P5, Υ5), ((close),P6, Υ6)] where
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, Pi(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, Pi(agR) = {a, b},
– P5(agR) = P6(agR) = {a, b, e},
– Υ1 = Υ2 = {{b, e}, {b, d}, {c}},
– Υ3 = Υ4 = {{a, b, e}, {a, b, d}, {a, c}},
– Υ3 = Υ4 = {{a, b, e}, {a, b, d}, {a, c}},
– Υ5 = Υ6 = {{a, b, e}, {a, b, d, e}, {a, c, e}}.
Dialogue(ds, sm, st) = [((open, f),P1, Υ1), ((pass),P2, Υ2), ((assert, a),P3, Υ3),
((pass),P4, Υ4), ((close),P5, Υ5)] where
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, Pi(agP ) = {a, b, c, d, e},
– ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, Pi(agR) = {a, b},
– Υ1 = Υ2 = {{b, e}, {b, d}, {c}},
– Υ3 = {{a, b, e}, {a, b, d}, {a, c}},
– Υ4 = Υ5 = {{a, c}}.
Thus we see that while the exhaustive and basic persuader types are each success-
ful, the smart persuader incorrectly perceives there to be no chance of convincing
the responder and terminates the dialogue unsuccessfully.
These results are summarised in Table 2. They demonstrate the potential
disadvantage of behaving economically (that is, choosing to give up trying to
persuade the responder as soon as, according to one’s image of the responder,
success seems impossible) in the case where the persuader’s image of the re-
sponder may not be accurate. Furthermore, they show that a smart persuader
may incorrectly perceive its position to be hopeless while a basic persuader may
not. We now consider the conditions under which an exhaustive persuader is
successful but an economical persuader (basic or smart) is not, following which
we consider the conditions under which an exhaustive and a basic persuader are
successful but a smart persuader is not.
For a dialogue scenario that is not accurate, it follows from our definitions
that the dialogue produced by an exhaustive persuader with a particular strategy
is successful but the dialogue produced by a basic persuader with the same strat-
egy is unsuccessful if and only if: the arguments asserted by the basic persuader
are a strict prefix of those asserted by the exhaustive persuader (condition 1 in
Prop. 11); the topic of the dialogue is determined to be acceptable by the union
of the responder’s initial position with the arguments asserted by the exhaustive
persuader (condition 2); there is no strict prefix of the arguments asserted by the
exhaustive persuader that, when combined with the responder’s initial position,
determines the topic to be acceptable (condition 3); for every element of the
persuader’s initial model of the responder, there is no subset of the persuader’s
initial position that contains the arguments asserted by the basic persuader and
that, when combined with the responder’s initial position, determines the topic
to be acceptable (condition 4); for every strict prefix of the arguments asserted
by the basic persuader, there is some subset of the persuader’s initial position
that contains that prefix and some element of the persuader’s initial model such
Outcome by persuader type Outcome combination possible
for dialogue scenarios that are
not accurate?
Exhaustive Basic Smart
Successful Successful Successful Yes (Proposition 7)
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Yes (Proposition 8)
Successful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Yes (Proposition 9)
Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful No (Proposition 6)
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Successful No (Proposition 5)
Unsuccessful Successful Successful No (Proposition 5/6)
Successful Unsuccessful Successful No (Proposition 5)
Successful Successful Unsuccessful Yes (Proposition 10)
Table 2. For a not-accurate dialogue scenario that is not accurate and a particular
dialogue strategy, identifies possible combinations of outcomes by persuader type.
that the union of the two determines the topic to be acceptable (condition 5).
Furthermore, it follows from these results that for every element Ψ of the per-
suader’s initial model of the responder: if Ψ is a proper subset of the responder’s
initial position, then there is a belief that the responder is aware of and of which
the persuader has no knowledge; if the responder’s initial position is a proper
subset of Ψ , then there is some belief in Ψ that is not in the responder’s ini-
tial position and is not asserted by the exhaustive persuader; otherwise there
is something in the responder’s initial position that is not in Ψ and there is
something in Ψ that is not in the responder’s initial position, and either there is
a belief in the responder’s initial position that is not present in the persuader’s
initial position, or there is a belief in Ψ that is not in the responder’s initial
position and is not asserted by the exhaustive persuader (condition 6).
Proposition 11. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, τ) ∈ S \ Sacc and st = [α1, . . . , αn] be a
strategy of ds.
Dialogue(ds, bas, st) is unsuccessful and Dialogue(ds, exh, st) is successful where
Dialogue(ds, bas, st) = [(open, τ), (pass), (assert, α1), (pass), . . . , (assert, αj),
(pass), (close)] and Dialogue(ds, exh, st) = [(open, τ), (pass), (assert, α1), (pass),
. . . , (assert, αk), (close)] iff
1. j < k,
2. τ ∈ Acceptable({α1, . . . , αk} ∪ P0(agR)),
3. @ i such that 1 ≤ i < k and τ ∈ Acceptable({α1, . . . , αi} ∪ P0(agR)),
4. ∀Ψ ∈ Υ0,@Φ ⊆ P0(agP ) such that {α1, . . . , αj} ⊂ Φ and τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪
Φ),
5. ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i < j, ∃Ψ ∈ Υ0 such that ∃Φ ⊆ P0(agP ) such that
{α1, . . . , αi} ⊂ Φ and τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪ Φ), and
6. ∀Ψ ∈ Υ0, either
– Ψ ⊂ P0(agR) and ∃φ ∈ P0(agR) \ Ψ such that φ 6∈ P0(agP ),
– P0(agR) ⊂ Ψ and ∃φ such that φ ∈ Ψ \ P0(agR) and φ 6∈ {α1, . . . , αk},
otherwise
– ∃φ ∈ P0(agR) \ Ψ , ∃ψ ∈ Ψ \ P0(agR), and either
• P0(agR) \ P0(agP ) 6= ∅, or
• ∃φ such that φ ∈ Ψ \ P0(agR) and φ 6∈ {α1, . . . , αk}.
Proof. Left to right. Condition 1 follows directly from the definition of successful
dialogues (Def. 3) and Prop. 1. Conditions 2-5 follow directly from the definitions
of a basic persuader, an exhaustive persuader, an economical persuader and a
regular dialogue (Defs. 4, 5 and 6.)
Since ds 6∈ Sacc, it cannot be the case that P0(agR) ∈ Υ0 (Def. 2), thus ∀Ψ ∈ Υ0,
either Ψ ⊂ P0(agR), P0(agR) ⊂ Ψ , or ∃φ ∈ P0(agR) \ Ψ and ∃ψ ∈ Ψ \ P0(agR).
We now consider these three cases in turn.
Let Ψ ∈ Υ0 such that Ψ ⊂ P0(agR). Since τ ∈ Acceptable({α1, . . . , αk}∪P0(agR))
and Ψ ⊂ P0(agR), τ ∈ Acceptable(Λ∪Ψ ∪ {α1, . . . , αk}) where Λ = P0(agR) \Ψ .
From 4, @Φ ⊆ P0(agP ) such that {α1, . . . , αj} ⊂ Φ and τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪ Φ).
Therefore, ∃φ ∈ Λ such that φ 6∈ P0(agP ) and thus ∃φ ∈ P0(agR) \ Ψ such that
φ 6∈ P0(agP ).
Let Ψ ∈ Υ0 such that P0(agR) ⊂ Ψ . It follows from 4 that τ 6∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪
{α1, . . . , αk}). Since τ ∈ Acceptable({α1, . . . , αk} ∪ P0(agR)) and P0(agR) ⊂ Ψ ,
it must be the case that ∃φ such that φ ∈ Ψ \ P0(agR) and φ 6∈ {α1, . . . , αk}.
Let Ψ ∈ Υ0 such that ∃φ ∈ P0(agR) \ Ψ and ∃ψ ∈ Ψ \ P0(agR). Assume
P0(agR) \ P0(agP ) = ∅ (i.e., P0(agR) ⊆ P0(agP )). Since P0(agR) ⊆ P0(agP ),
it follows from 4 that τ 6∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪ {α1, . . . , αk} ∪ P0(agR)). Since τ ∈
Acceptable({α1, . . . , αk} ∪ P0(agR)), it follows that ∃φ ∈ Ψ such that φ 6∈
({α1, . . . , αn} ∪ P0(agR)). Therefore either P0(agR) \ P0(agP ) 6= ∅, or ∃φ such
that φ ∈ Ψ \ P0(agR) and φ 6∈ {α1, . . . , αk}.
Right to left. Follows from conditions 2-5 and from the definitions of a basic per-
suader, an exhaustive persuader, an economical persuader and a regular dialogue
(Defs. 4, 5 and 6.).
Also considering only non-accurate dialogue scenarios, it similarly follows
from our definitions that the dialogue produced by a basic persuader with a
particular strategy is successful but the dialogue produced by a smart persuader
with the same strategy is unsuccessful if and only if: the arguments asserted by
the smart persuader are a strict prefix of those asserted by the basic persuader
(condition 1, Prop. 12); the topic of the dialogue is determined to be acceptable
by the union of responder’s initial position with the arguments asserted by the
basic persuader (condition 2); there is no strict prefix of the arguments asserted
by the basic persuader that, when combined with the responder’s initial position,
determines the topic to be acceptable (condition 3); for every element Ψ of the
persuader’s initial model of the responder, either Ψ determines the topic to be
acceptable, or there is some strict prefix of the arguments asserted by the smart
persuader that when combined with Ψ determines the topic to be acceptable, or
there is no subset of the persuader’s initial position that contains the arguments
asserted by the smart persuader and when combined with Ψ determines the topic
to be acceptable (condition 4); for every strict prefix p1 of the arguments asserted
by the smart persuader, there is some element Ψ of the persuader’s initial model
such that there is no strict prefix p2 of p1 (including the empty prefix) that
when combined with Ψ determines the topic to be acceptable and such that
there exists some subset of the persuader’s initial position that contains p1 and
when combined with Ψ determines the topic to be acceptable.
Proposition 12. Let ds = (Ag,P0, Υ0, τ) ∈ S \ Sacc and st = [α1, . . . , αn] be a
strategy of ds.
Dialogue(ds, sm, st) is unsuccessful and Dialogue(ds, bas, st) is successful where
Dialogue(ds, sm, st) = [(open, τ), (pass), (assert, α1), (pass), . . . , (assert, αj),
(pass), (close)] and Dialogue(ds, bas, st) = [(open, τ), (pass), (assert, α1), (pass),
. . . , (assert, αk), (close)] iff
1. j < k,
2. τ ∈ Acceptable({α1, . . . , αk} ∪ P0(agR)),
3. ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i < k, ∃Ψ ∈ Υ0 such that ∃Φ ⊆ P0(agP ) such that
{α1, . . . , αi} ⊂ Φ and τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪ Φ).
4. ∀Ψ ∈ Υ0 such that τ 6∈ Acceptable(Ψ) and @ i such that 1 ≤ i < j and
τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪{α1, . . . , αi}), @Φ ⊆ P0(agP ) such that {α1, . . . , αj} ⊂ Φ
and τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪ Φ),
5. ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i < j, ∃Ψ ∈ Υ0 such that τ 6∈ Acceptable(Ψ), @h such that
1 ≤ h < i and τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪ {α1, . . . , αh}), and ∃Φ ⊆ P0(agP ) such
that {α1, . . . , αi} ⊂ Φ and τ ∈ Acceptable(Ψ ∪ Φ).
Proof. Follows from the definitions of successful dialogues, a basic persuader, a
smart persuader, an economical persuader and a regular dialogue (Defs. 3, 4, 5
and 6) and Prop. 1.
Propositions 11 and 12 identify the necessary and sufficient conditions under
which, while following the same strategy, a persuader of one type will successfully
convince the responder, while a persuader of another type will not. These results
help us to understand the situations in which the use of the different update
mechanisms considered here can be disadvantageous.
6 Discussion
In this paper we have formally investigated the use of two approaches (basic and
smart) for updating an uncertain opponent model in simple persuasion dialogues,
where the persuader uses such a model to determine whether there is any chance
of the dialogue leading to success, giving up and unsuccessfully terminating the
dialogue as soon as it believes this not to be the case. We have shown that,
if the persuader’s initial model of the responder is accurate (i.e., represents
the responder’s actual position as being possible) there is no difference in the
outcomes produced by the different persuader types with a particular strategy
(where a strategy here predetermines the sequence of assertions to make), but a
smart persuader may produce a shorter dialogue than a basic persuader, and a
basic persuader may produce a shorter dialogue than an exhaustive persuader. In
the case where the persuader’s initial model of the responder does not represent
the responder’s actual initial position as a possibility, we have shown that it
is possible for an exhaustive persuader to succeed in persuading the responder,
while both a basic and a smart persuader following the same strategy will fail,
and that it is possible for an exhaustive and basic persuader to be successful
while a smart persuader following the same strategy will fail, and identified the
conditions under which these cases occur.
These results help us to understand the situations under which it can be
useful to apply the basic or the smart model update mechanism. If shorter dia-
logues are desirable and it is certain that the responder’s actual initial position
is captured as a possibility in the persuader’s model, then a smart persuader
will produce the best outcome, only producing an unsuccessful dialogue if nei-
ther a basic nor exhaustive persuader would succeed with the same strategy,
but potentially terminating the dialogue at an earlier stage than the other types
of persuader. If the persuader’s model might not contain the responder’s actual
initial position as a possibility, then both a smart and a basic persuader risks
incorrectly perceiving its position to be hopeless and unsuccessfully terminating
the dialogue when in fact continuing with its strategy would lead to success.
Other works have investigated the use of a model of what is known to the
opponent in order to generate a proponent’s dialogue strategy. Rienstra et al.
[6] apply a variation of the maxmin algorithm to an uncertain opponent model
in order to determine the moves that produce the best expected outcome, while
Black et al. [5] use automated planning techniques to generate a strategy with the
highest chance of success given an uncertain opponent model. In contrast, here we
do not consider here the generation of a dialogue strategy (we assume a sequence
of assertions to make); however, our results can be beneficial in such settings,
particularly in understanding the situations in which a possible strategy might
be incorrectly classified as hopeless (using the results from Props. 11 and 12).
In their work, Rienstra et al. [6] apply the basic model update mechanism and
Black et al. [5] use the smart approach, however neither explicitly considers the
effect the update mechanism has on the outcome of the dialogue. Hadjinikolis
et al. [7, 8] propose a method an agent can use to augment an opponent model
with extra information, based on previous dialogue experience, however they do
not consider how this relates to dialogue outcome.
Hunter [11] also considers different mechanisms for updating an opponent
model during a dialogue, where this opponent model represents the strength
of belief the persuader believes its opponent has in different arguments (in the
sense that it finds them convincing). In contrast, our opponent model represents
the beliefs the persuader believes the responder is aware of and the responder’s
belief in the claims of arguments can be captured with the Acceptable function.
Hunter considers how the accuracy of a user model can be improved through the
use of moves that query the opponent’s beliefs; it will be interesting to consider
how an opponent model in our setting can be improved with such moves.
While the persuasion dialogue we consider here is simple, in that it is unidi-
rectional and the responder’s choice of moves is determined by its position and
what has been asserted by the persuader, we believe that the results we present
here provide useful foundations for exploring the behaviour of such model up-
date functions in more complex persuasion situations, where each participant is
asserting beliefs with the aim of persuading the other. The intuition underlying
each of the basic and the smart update functions (to add to one’s model beliefs
that are asserted and to remove from one’s model anything that is inconsistent
with the opponent’s behaviour) are also applicable in the symmetric persua-
sion setting, and we plan to adapt the results presented here to the symmetric
persuasion setting in future work.
We also plan in future work to allow the assignment of probabilities to our
uncertain opponent model and adapt our model update mechanisms to manage
these, as is considered by Rienstra et al. [6] and Hunter [11]. The combination
of probability with argumentation is a growing area of interest; e.g., recent work
has proposed a framework for analysing the expected utility of probabilistic
strategies for argument dialogues [12], while Oren et al. consider the use of a
probabilistic audience model to determine convincing arguments to move in a
monologue [13]. It will be interesting to investigate how the choice of update
mechanism for a probabilistic opponent model impacts on dialogue outcome.
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